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Article 3

Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in
Modern Legal Opinions
Robert C. Farrell*

I. INTRODUCTION

Does it matter that the editors of thirty-three law journals, including
those at Yale and Michigan, think that there is a "passive tense"? l Does
it matter that the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth 2 and
Eleventh 3 Circuits think that there is a "passive mood"? Does it matter
that the editors of fourteen law reviews think that there is a "subjunctive
tense"? 4 Does it matter that the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit thinks that there is a "subjunctive voice'"? 5
There is, in fact, no "passive tense" or "passive mood." The passive
is a voice. 6 There is no "subjunctive voice" or "subjunctive tense." The
subjunctive is a mood.7 The examples in the first paragraph suggest
that there is widespread unfamiliarity among lawyers and law students

* B.A., Trinity College; J.D., Harvard University; Professor, Quinnipiac University School of
Law. The author thanks Susan Dailey and Bill Dunlap for their helpful comments. The title of
this article is suggested by the title of a book written by the author's brother, Frank B. Farrell.
FRANK B. FARRELL, WHY DOES LITERATURE MATrER? (2004).
1. A Westlaw search of the Journals and Law Reviews Database, as of August 17, 2007,
reveals thirty-four journals using the phrase "passive tense." Of these, thirty-three, including the
Yale Law Journal and the Michigan Law Review, assume that there is a passive tense. One
correctly notes that "there is no passive tense." Mary Barnard Ray, Legal Writing: Transitions
Enable Readers to Follow the Writer's Thinking, WIS. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 35, 35.
2. Steam v. Superior Distrib. Co., 674 F.2d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[Tlhe significance of
the word 'be' in the phrase 'to be rotated' is that it changes 'rotated' from the active to the passive
mood.").
3. Armenia v. Dugger, 867 F.2d 1370, 1375 (1 lth Cir. 1989) ("Armenia contends that the
court's continued adherence to this interpretation ... supports his argument that a change from
the passive mood ...to the active mood of the verb 'to cause' ... was not a major change.").
4. A Westlaw search of the Journals and Law Reviews Database, as of August 17, 2007,
reveals fourteen uses of the phrase "subjunctive tense."
5. Ameren Servs. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 330 F.3d 494, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("As the Commission
emphasizes on review, its interpretation relies primarily on Section A.2's combined use of the
subjunctive voice and present tense.").
6. See infra Part H.B (discussing the voice of verbs).
7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the mood of verbs).
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with the terminology that describes verb forms. 8 Fortunately, in most
cases, it does not matter. In general, it is possible for a lawyer to speak
and write well even if that lawyer is not familiar with the grammatical
terminology that describes the structure of the English language. A
person who has spent a lifetime reading good English and conversing
with speakers of good English will have internalized the rhythms and
sounds of the language and thus can speak and write well, even without9
a formal understanding of grammatical principles and terminology.
Such a person will usually be able to use the passive and the subjunctive
correctly, even while not being able to explain that the first is a voice
and the second a mood. In most cases, then, the ability to distinguish a
tense from a voice from a mood is not particularly important.
However, in a small percentage of cases, including some important
ones, courts explicitly rely on grammatical terminology' ° to explain
their decisions. In these cases, a lawyer or law student unfamiliar with
the categories and labels of grammar will be at a great disadvantage if
he is unable to make or respond to arguments based on grammatical
principles. This article responds to that problem in two ways. First, it
summarizes the basic grammar of verb forms, and second, it gives
explicit examples of cases where the form of a verb has determined, in
whole or in part, the result in a legal case. l l This article will not
undertake the arduous task of reviewing all of English grammar but will
limit itself to the study of verbs, as verbs are probably the most
important words in the English language and are most likely to affect
the outcome of a legal case.
The use of grammar to decide legal cases is not a novelty. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that it "naturally does not
review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; but neither
[does it] regard ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant to a

8. Cf BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 135 (2002) ("There
seems to be a wave of incapacity for grammar, comparable to the phenomenon of a crime wave."
(quoting Edward N. Teall)).
9. In fact, there is a view that "the teaching of formal grammar has a negligible or... even a
harmful effect on the improvement in writing." RICHARD BRADDOCK, RICHARD LLOYD-JONES
& LOWELL SCHOER, RESEARCH INWRITrEN COMPOSITION 37-38 (1963).
10. The term "grammar" can be given different meanings, but here it is used in the sense of
"the internalized system of rules that the speakers of a language share." Martha Kolln, Closing
the Books on Alchemy, 32 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 139, 141 (1981). The goal of grammar
instruction is thus "to help [students] understand consciously the system they know
subconsciously as native speakers, to teach them the necessary categories and labels that will
enable them to think about and talk about their language." Id. at 150.

11.

See infra Part II (summarizing the grammar of the various verb forms and discussing cases

where a verb form has influenced the result).
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construction of those enactments." 12 Further, the Court has noted that
"Congress' use of verb tense is considered significant in construing
statutes." 13 This article will attempt to demonstrate that a basic
familiarity with the terminology of verb forms is not simply the
pretentiousness of a pompous pedant but is rather a very useful tool in
the arsenal of legal argumentation.
14
II. VERB FoRMs

Verbs are action or linking words. 15 They are essential to a sentence,
and they tend to be the most important words in a sentence. For
example, the action verbs "run" and "carry" can be used to form the
simple sentences "John runs fast" or "John carries the water." "Is" and
"seem" are common linking verbs, and each can be used to form the
sentences "John is tall" and "The water seems hot." Verbs generally
can be characterized by five properties: person 16 (first person, second
person, or third person), number 17 (singular or plural), tense 18 (present,
19
past, future, present perfect, past perfect, or future perfect), voice
20
(active or passive), and mood (indicative, subjunctive, or imperative).
A particular form of any verb can be identified by reference to these
five properties. Thus, the verb phrase "he carries" is in the third person,
singular number, present tense, active voice, and indicative mood of the
verb "to carry." In addition to these forms, there are also verbals,
consisting of gerunds, infinitives, and participles; 2 1 these are verb forms
that function as nouns, adjectives, or adverbs. Traditionally, the correct

12. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960).
13. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992).
14. The following reference works will be used as sources of authority on grammatical
principles: MARCELLA FRANK, MODERN ENGLISH: A PRACTICAL REFERENCE GUIDE (1972);
GARNER, supra note 8; ANDREA A. LUNSFORD, THE ST. MARTIN'S HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2003); J.
MARTYN WALSH & ANNA KATHLEEN WALSH, PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK, A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO GOOD ENGLISH (rev. ed. 1959).

15. See LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 616-44 (discussing the proper use of verbs).
16. See infra Part I1.D (discussing the person of a verb in three cases in which the person of
the verb affected the outcome).
17. See infra Part II.E (discussing the properties of the number of a verb and three cases which
depended on the number).
18. See infra Part II.C (discussing the verb tense and five cases in which the verb tense was
crucial in resolving legal arguments).
19. See infra Part lI.B (discussing the elements of voice and four cases in which the voice of
the verb determined the courts' actions).
20. See infra Part II.A (discussing the properties of mood and six cases in which the outcomes
were determined by the mood of a verb).
21. See infra Part H.F (discussing verbals and properties of gerunds, infinitives, and
participles and six cases determined by verbals).
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arrangement of a verb form through its voice, mood, tense, person, and
number is called the "conjugation" of the verb.2 2 In order to keep these
concepts clear and separate, it is helpful to see a sample of a fully
conjugated verb in one place, with all of its permutations. The full
conjugation of the verb "to sue" is provided in an appendix to this
article and can be used as a basic reference as the individual forms of
the verb are introduced.23
The mistaken references in the opening paragraph of this article
involved confusion as to these various properties of verbs. This section
will examine each of the five properties of verbs-mood, voice, tense,
person, and number-and then give examples where the differences
24 It will
among the properties made a difference in a legal decision.
then examine instances where the use of a gerund, infinitive, or
participle influenced the result in a case. 2 5 It will begin with mood and
voice, as these 6are the most common forms of the verb to have legal
2
consequences.
A. Mood
It is difficult to convey a sense of the concept of verb mood in the
abstract. As an introduction, "mood" is generally defined as indicating
"the attitude of the writer toward what he or she is saying."27 The
indicative mood, by far the most widely used of the moods, "express[es]
a fact, opinion, or inquiry," 28 such as "The sun rises in the east" or
"Does the sun rise in the east?" The subjunctive mood expresses "a
wish, suggestion, requirement, or condition contrary to fact." 29 With
the exception of the verb "to be," the form of the subjunctive differs
from the indicative only in the third person singular (e.g., "I insist that
he come to class on time"). The subjunctive form of the verb "to be" in
the present tense is "be" for all persons and numbers (e.g., "If this be
treason, make the most of it") and "were" for all persons and numbers
in the past tense (e.g., "If I were a king, I would be rich"). The
imperative mood expresses a command, such as "Open the door." This

22. WALSH & WALSH, supra note 14, at 32.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Appendix (conjugating the verb "to sue").
See infra Parts II.A-E (looking at the five properties of verbs).
See infra Part 1I.F (examining gerunds, infinitives, and participles).
See infra Parts I1.A-B (discussing the properties of mood and voice).
LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 633.
Id.
Id.
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section examines cases where the mood of a verb determined the
30
interpretation of a statute, beginning with the indicative mood.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,3 1 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act 3 2 (ADA) and
determined that Congress's choice of verb mood was significant. In
Sutton, twin sisters with very poor eyesight applied to United Airlines
for positions as commercial airline pilots and were rejected because
they did not meet the airline's minimum vision requirement. 33 The
sisters then sued the airline under the ADA, claiming that they had been
34
the victims of unlawful discrimination because of their disabilities.
The specific legal issue in Sutton was whether the sisters were
"disabled" within the terms of the statute, because, with corrective
lenses, each had vision that was "20/20 or better." 35 More generally,
the question was whether "the determination [of] whether an individual
is disabled should be made with reference to measures ... that mitigate
the individual's impairment,"'3 6 including eyeglasses and contact lenses.
The Court looked to the language of the statute, which defined
disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual. '37 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission had earlier interpreted this
statutory language as requiring case-by-case determinations, "without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or
prosthetic devices." 38 The Court disagreed. 39 Looking at the statutory
language "substantially limits," the Court noted that that phrase
"appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form," 40 and therefore
requires that "a person be presently-not potentially or hypotheticallysubstantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability." 4 1 It was not
sufficient that a person have an impairment that 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not

30. See infra Part lI.A (discussing the properties of mood and six cases in which the outcomes
were determined by the mood of a verb).
31. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
33. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
34. Id. at 476.
35. Id. at 475.
36. Id. at 472.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
38. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998)).
39. Id. at 482.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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taken." 42 Unfortunately for the sisters, their corrected vision was within
the normal range so that their impairment did not in fact limit a major
life activity. 43 Thus, they did not even satisfy the first requirement of
the ADA-that they be "disabled. 4 4 Further, even if they had satisfied
that requirement, they could not ultimately have prevailed against
United Air Lines unless they also showed that, "with or without
reasonable accommodation [s]," they could "perform the essential
45
functions of the employment position."
If the language of the ADA had been written in the subjunctive
mood, defining disability as an impairment that "would limit" or "might
limit" one or more major life activities, then the Court might have
reached a different result. Thus, the Court made reference to certain
modals ("might," "could," and "would") that might have referred to a
"hypothetical uncorrected state." 46 However, because the statute was
written in the indicative mood, this hypothetical state of uncorrected
vision was not relevant. Instead, the Court focused on the actual facts
47
of the claimants' impairments and their actual use of corrective lenses.
The majority opinion in Sutton is open to the criticism that it invites
opportunistic behavior by those who might intentionally refrain from
correcting an impairment so that they might qualify, at least at the initial
stages of litigation, for the protection of the ADA.4 8 Nevertheless, the
point here is that a reader of the majority opinion who does not
understand the different functions of the indicative and subjunctive
moods would be missing a significant underpinning to the Court's
ultimate decision in favor of the airline.
The Sutton case dealt with the situation where claimants had in fact
mitigated their disabilities with corrective devices and yet wanted their
disabilities measured without regard to those corrective devices. 49 It did
not address the reverse situation of those whose disabilities could be
mitigated by surgery or medical treatment but who were unwilling to

42. Id.
43. Id. at481.
44. Id. at 482.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990).
46. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
47. Id. at 488.
48. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 103
MICH. L. REV. 217, 233 (2004) (suggesting that if a court adopts a no-mitigation standard, then
"the Sutton plaintiffs [would] have rationally acted to discard their corrective lenses before
applying to United Airlines").
49. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
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undergo such treatment. 50 Were such persons disabled under the terms
of the ADA? In answering this question, once again the mood of the
verb "limits" was significant. In Capizzi v. County of Placer,5 1 the
court considered the case of a woman who had elbow tendinitis that
prevented her from lifting more than five pounds but who was unwilling
to receive cortisone shots or undergo surgery that would very likely cure
her disability. 5 2 The defendant, her employer, argued that the employee
was not disabled because she had "failed to avail herself of effective
corrective treatments." 5 3 In analyzing this issue, the court concluded
that a failure to treat does not defeat an ADA cause of action. 54 The
court cited Sutton and its reference to the "present indicative," requiring
that a person be presently disabled.5 5 Thus "the fact that a particular
procedure would mitigate the condition cannot prevent a finding that the
56
plaintiff is presently disabled."
In contrast to the disability cases that emphasized the indicative mood
and its basis in reality and fact, several other cases have focused on the
subjunctive mood with its hypothetical, or contra-factual, perspective.
In Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse,57 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court considered the timeliness of an appeal that, under the rules of the
court, had to be filed within thirty days of an appealable order. 58 At the
trial, the plaintiff had won a substantial jury verdict and the defendant
had moved for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. 59 In response, the trial judge issued two documents. 60 The
first, on May 18, stated, "the motions should be overruled. 6 1 The
62
second, on June 2, stated that the motions "are hereby overruled.
The defendant filed his appeal on June 30,63 which was within thirty
days of the June 2 order but more than thirty days after the May 18
order. The question before the court was which document was the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
135 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
885 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1994).
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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appealable order that started the thirty-day calendar. 64 The court
determined that it was the June 2 document and allowed the appeal to
proceed. 6 5 The basis for this decision was that the verb form in the first
document was in the subjunctive mood and thus did not constitute an
"order." 66
As the court explained, the word "should" "places [the] statement in
the subjunctive mood.' 67 Technically, this construction of "should" as
a subjunctive is rather broad by modem grammatical standards, which
consider words like "should" and "would" to be "modal auxiliaries" that
are used with the base form of the verb to create a form of the indicative
mood. 68 However, there is no question that older versions of English
grammar considered "should" and "would" to be part of the subjunctive
mood, 69 and legions of former Latin students know that these forms are
treated as subjunctives when translated into Latin.70 Even today, these
modal auxiliaries do the work of the subjunctive mood even if they are
not technically considered to be the subjunctive. 7 ' In any case, the
Kelsey court, having taken a broader view of what constitutes the
subjunctive, went on to explain that "[t]he subjunctive mood is a verb
form representing an act or state, not as a fact, but as contingent or
possible." 7 2 Thus, the trial judge in his May 18 order "set his statement
in the subjunctive mood, here a representation that the motions were
going to be, but had not yet been, overruled. 7 3 The court found that the
June 2 order, which stated that the motions "are hereby, overruled," in
fact overruled the motions because it was in the indicative mood. 4
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 842 (identifying the nine basic modal auxiliaries as can,
could, will, would, shall,should, may, might, and must).
69. See E.B. Setzler, Why Not a Future Subjunctive, 23 MOD. LANGUAGE NOTES 243, 244
(1908) ("[A]II of the functions of the auxiliary forms would and should are properly subjunctive
functions-they are functions that belong to the subjunctive mood in languages generally, and
that go to make up the very concept of the mood itself.").
70. See, e.g., JOSEPH HENRY ALLEN & JAMES BRADSTREET GREENOUGH, ALLEN AND
GREENOUGH'S NEW LATIN GRAMMAR 282 (J.B. Greenough et al. eds., 1931) (identifying the
verb phrases "I would say" and "I should incline" as subjunctives).
71. FRANK, supra note 14, at 95 (indicating that the modal auxiliaries "add to the verb a
special semantic component such as ability, obligation, possibility. Some of the modal auxiliaries
express the same kinds of semantic coloring as verbs in the subjunctive mood (note the
relationship between modal and mood).").
72. Kelsey, 885 P.2d at 1354 (citing MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1172
(10th ed. 1993)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Therefore, the June 2 order started the appellate clock running, and the
75
defendant's appeal within thirty days was timely.
Three dissenting justices strongly disagreed with the majority's
emphasis on grammar. 76 They argued that the meaning of the May 18
order ought "not to be divined from the rules of grammar," but rather
from "the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its
immemorial language usage." 77 For the dissenters, the majority should
have read the order as a whole to determine the judge's intent. 7 8 The
dissenters were of the view that on May 18 the trial judge intended to
issue an "in praesenti" ruling that resolved the matter. 79 Further, on the
grammatical point itself, the dissenters pointed out that, according to
modem English grammar books, the term "should" does not always
operate as a subjunctive at all but rather is capable of being "employed
as, virtually, a present indicative synonymous with ought."80 For the
dissenters, the majority had exalted form over substance by giving
effect to a grammatical technicality over the trial judge's intent. 8 1 The
dissenters may have been right about this, but the fact that they were the
dissenters suggests the importance of understanding grammatical
technicalities.
Nelson v. Maryland82 is another case where a court explained 8a3
procedural decision on the basis of the subjunctive mood of the verb.
In that case, the attorney for a criminal defendant, who initially objected
at trial to the admission of a report that may have been inadmissible
under the hearsay rule, later declined to pursue the objection. 84 When
the defendant (now the appellant) attempted to challenge the
admissibility of this evidence on appeal, the appellate court would not
hear the argument because "the admissibility of evidence admitted
The court
without objection cannot be reviewed on appeal." 8 5
explained that "[a]ppellate review ...is concerned with actual trials that
take place in the real world, to wit, with rulings that trial judges make in
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1356 (Opala, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1357.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1357 n.15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting E. PARTRIDGE, USAGE AND
ABUSAGE 376 (1963)).
81. Id. at 1357.
82. 768 A.2d 738 (Md. 2001).
83. Id. at 738.
84. Id. at 749.
85. Id. at 749-50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hall v. State, 705 A.2d 50, 56
(Md. 1998)).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

the indicative mood."-86 On the other hand, the appellant was trying to
take the court "[t]hrough the Looking Glass into a world where events
are in the subjunctive mood.'' 87 The appellant's brief argued that "IF
defense counsel HAD MAINTAINED his original objection, HE
WOULD HAVE BEEN overruled, 8 8 and thus he would have had an
appealable issue. The court responded by asking whether the appellant
would have been satisfied "by a holding in the subjunctive mood: 'And
IF THAT HAD HAPPENED, WE WOULD HAVE REVERSED the
convictions'? '89
Unfortunately for the appellant, the court was
unwilling to "make holdings that might have been in response to rulings
90
that might have been."
In re Bading91 is a bankruptcy case in which the court explained its
decision by reference to the subjunctive mood. Bading considered the
extent to which the bankruptcy trustee was entitled to a refund of
federal taxes that the debtor received after her bankruptcy proceeding
had begun but which was attributable to income earned earlier. 92 The
debtor had married shortly after filing her bankruptcy petition and then
filed a joint return with her new husband for the relevant tax year. 93 As
a result of her marriage and the filing of the joint return, the debtor and
her husband received a refund of $2,167, and the trustee wanted eightyfive percent of the debtor's half of that refund.9 4 The debtor argued that
the trustee was only entitled to eighty-five percent of $178, which was
the amount her refund would have been had she not married and had she
not filed a joint return. 95 The debtor claimed that her marriage, which
occurred after her petition in bankruptcy, should not have affected the
size of the trustee's claim to her tax refund. 9 6
The bankruptcy court rejected the debtor's argument. 97 First, as a
matter of federal tax law, one's marital status is determined at the close
of the tax year. 9 8 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, "the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 750 n.6 (emphasis added).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
154 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Bankruptcy Code is not a statute written in the subjunctive mood; it is
written in the indicative mood." 99 Up to a point, the court agreed with
the debtor:
Had she indeed not married in the tax year that generated the larger
refund, she would only in fact have received the smaller refund, and
would only owe the Trustee the very amount she now proposes he
receive. But she did marry
and that fact has consequences under the
10 0
Internal Revenue Code.
The court explained that it was better to "stick with the indicative
mood," and thus to "parse tax refunds based not on 'what ifs' but what
s."101

The last of the three moods is the imperative, which is used to
express a command. In Perkins v. Maryland,10 2 a criminal defendant's
conviction was set aside because of the imperative mood. 10 3 Perkins
had been convicted of possession of narcotics paraphernalia, and, on
appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the search of his motel
room. 10 4 The police claimed that the search was lawful because, even
though they did not have a warrant, the defendant had consented to the
search. 10 5 The court reviewed the evidence surrounding the search and
summarized the relevant facts as follows. 10 6 At 2:30 a.m., the police,
having obtained a passkey from the motel clerk, knocked on the
defendant's door. 10 7 When the defendant responded, "Who is it?" the
police replied, "Howard County Police. Open the door." 10 8 The
defendant then opened the door, and the police found the drug
paraphernalia. 10 9 The appellate court found that no consent had been
given and that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment.1 1 0
In explaining its decision, the court said that the statement, "Howard
County Police. Open the door," was in the imperative mood. i l1 The
court further reasoned that "[t]hose are words of command, not of

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
574 A.2d 356 (Md. 1990).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 359-60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 360.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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request."'1 12 In these circumstances, "even ostensible consent is not
voluntary when it is 'no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority."' 1 13 The defendant's own explanation of events confirmed
this understanding of the facts. 114 He said, "I had to open it, he ordered
me."1 15 Thus, the search was set aside and the criminal conviction
1 16
overturned because of the mood of a verb.
Finally, before concluding this examination of the mood of verbs and
their influence on legal conclusions, it is prudent to sound a cautionary
note. Even if grammar is ordinarily a very helpful and important tool
for interpreting statutes, it does not trump legislative intent when that
117
intent is clearly to the contrary. Goldman v. StandardInsurance Co.
is an example of a case favoring legislative intent over grammatical
construction. In Goldman, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit examined the term "disability" under the California Unruh
Civil Rights Act, 118 a state statute similar to the federal ADA. The
plaintiff had applied for disability insurance based on anxiety and
119
depression, and Standard Insurance Company refused to insure her.
The plaintiff claimed that the refusal violated the Unruh Act. 120 The
problem with Goldman's claim was that, as a result of therapy, she
functioned effectively in her daily life1 21 and was thus not "presently"
limited in any major life activity. The insurer was unwilling to insure
her not because she was presently disabled, but because she "may
someday be entirely prohibited from working given her diagnosis of
122
adjustment disorder."
If the Supreme Court's Sutton opinion had been controlling, it seems
that Goldman's claim should have failed because she was not presently
disabled. 123 However, the Goldman court was construing a state statute
that, though possibly similar to the federal ADA, had a different

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. (quoting Bumper v. N.C., 391 U.S. 543 (1968)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at362.
341 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2003).
119. Goldman, 341 F.3d at 1025.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1028.
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42 (discussing the interpretation of statutory
language in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)); Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co.,
341 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).
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legislative history. 124 The Unruh Act itself did not define the term
"disability," but the Goldman court assumed for the sake of argument
that, if there had been a statutory definition of "disability," it "would
also have been expressed using 'limits' in the present indicative." 125
However, that assumption was not determinative in interpreting the
term "disabled." 126 The legislation that amended the Unruh Act made it
clear that the newly enacted statutory term "physical disability" was to
be given the same meaning that had been given to the term "physical
handicap" in an earlier opinion of the California Supreme Court. 127 In
that earlier opinion, the California Supreme Court interpreted the term
"physical handicap" to include conditions that "may handicap in the
future but have no presently disabling effect."' 12 8 Following this
precedent, the federal appellate court did not construe the term "limits"
"to imply a requirement of present disability." 129 It was enough if
Goldman "was regarded as having a disability that might limit a major
life activity in the future." 130 The intent of the California legislature, as
evidenced by its adoption of an earlier court interpretation,
had trumped
13 1
the assumed grammatical mood of the verb "limits."
The cases cited in this section, with the exception of Goldman,
demonstrate that the different moods of the verb have clearly made a
difference to the judges writing the opinions. The attorneys litigating
these cases would have been unable to argue persuasively to the court if
they had not understood the indicative, subjunctive, and imperative
moods. An attorney citing these cases today as precedent could not do
so intelligently without an understanding of the moods of the verbs.
Mood matters.
B. Voice
The "voice" of a verb indicates "whether the subject of the sentence
is acting . . . or being acted upon."' 132 In the active voice, the subject
performs the action, as in, "The man carries the water." In the passive
voice, the subject is being acted upon or receives the action, as in "The

124. Goldman, 341 F.3d at 1029.
125. Id. at 1030-31.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1031 (citing Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d
1151, 1155 (Cal. 1982)).
128. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 651 P.2d at 1155.
129. Goldman, 341 F.3d at 1031.
130. Id. at 1032.
131. Id. at 1031.
132. LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 631; see also id. at 631-33 (discussing voice).
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water is carried by the man." Although the use of the passive voice is
not, without more, grammatically incorrect, many style books insist that
the use of the passive should be minimized because it is weaker than the
active voice1 33 and can be "generally hard to understand and
remember." 134 It also tends to be the voice used by a person seeking to
avoid responsibility for his actions, as in the popular politician pseudoapology, "mistakes were made."' 135 Nevertheless, the use of the passive
is approved by stylists in two situations: "(1) where the actor is
unknown or unimportant [e.g., 'My wallet was stolen.'], and (2) where
the emphasis is on the recipient of the action instead of the actor [e.g.,
'President Kennedy was assassinated.']." 136 The use of the passive
voice has had significant consequences in the following cases.
In United States v. Zavalza-Rodriguez,13 7 the defendant was
convicted, pursuant to a plea agreement, of possessing heroin with
intent to distribute. The issue before the court was the proper
interpretation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 13 8 As part of his
plea agreement, the defendant agreed to a two-level increase in his
sentence because of the presence of a handgun in the bedroom where he
was staying. 139 The defendant, however, also asked for a reduction of
his sentence on the ground that he had not used violence or possessed a
weapon in connection with the offense. 140 The interpretive issue turned
on two competing provisions of the sentencing guidelines. The first
provision increased the sentence "if a dangerous weapon . . . was
possessed."' 14 1 The second reduced the sentence if "the defendant did
not... possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon.. . in connection
The government argued that because the
with the offense." 142
defendant stipulated that a weapon was "possessed" under the first of
these provisions, he could not assert that he had not "possessed" a
143
weapon under the second.

133. GARNER, supra note 8, at 144.
134. LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 632.
135. E.g., John M. Broder, Familiar Fallback for Officials: "Mistakes Were Made," N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at Al 8 (characterizing Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's admission
that "mistakes were made" as the "classic Washington linguistic construct").
136. GARNER, supra note 8, at 144.
137. 379 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2004).
138. Id. at 1184.
139. Id.
140. Id.at 1183.
141. id. at 1184 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2007)).
142. Id. at 1185 n.I (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(a)(2) (2007)).
143. Id. at 1183.
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The court rejected the government's argument, in large part because
of the different voices used in the Sentencing Guidelines. 14 4 Under the
first enhancing provision, the verb was "written in the passive voice,
requiring a sentence enhancement 'if a dangerous weapon (including a
firearm) was possessed."" 14 5 This verb form did not identify who was
doing the possessing and thus was broad enough to cover situations of
"mere proximity" to a weapon by a defendant, without a showing of
"active possession." 14 6 In order to enhance a defendant's sentence
under this provision, the government needed only show that "the
weapon was found in the same location where drugs or drug
paraphernalia are stored."' 14 7 Possession
therefore meant "possession by
48
proximity-constructive possession." 1
On the other hand, the verb form in the second, mitigating section,
"did not possess ... a firearm," 14 9 is in "the active voice[,] requiring the
defendant to do the possessing,"' 150 or more accurately, requiring the
defendant not to do the possessing. This provision "focus[es] on the
defendant's own conduct"' 15 1 and recognizes "a distinction between
constructive and actual possession." 152 The government had not
introduced evidence that the defendant himself had possessed the gun,
so there was no contradiction in the district court's finding that the
defendant himself had never "possessed" the gun for purposes of the
sentence reduction provision of the guidelines. 15 3 The distinction
between the active and passive voices meant that the defendant was
sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, without regard to the statutory
154
minimum.
In State v. Roberts,15 5 the passive voice was at least part of a reason
for a court's invalidation of a death sentence. The jury had convicted
the defendant of both aggravated premeditated first-degree murder and
first-degree felony murder, and had sentenced him to death. 15 6 Two

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.at 1186.

Id.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1186-87 (citing United States v. Roederer, I I F.3d 973, 983 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1186 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1 .1(b)(l) (2007)).
Id. (citing In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1188.
Id. at 1184 (noting that a sentence of sixty months was imposed).
14 P.3d 713 (Wash.2001).
Id. at719.
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men, the defendant Roberts and his accomplice Cronin, had committed
the crime but there was a dispute as to which of the two men actually
committed the murder. 157 One of the issues on appeal was whether the
jury instructions had wrongfully authorized the jury to convict Roberts
of aggravated first-degree murder, which subjected him to the death
rather than the one
penalty, if Roberts had been merely an accomplice,
58
who had actually performed the murder.'
The relevant statute defined "aggravated first-degree murder" as firstdegree murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances. 159 The jury
instructions identified one of the "aggravating circumstances" as when
"[t]he murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in
immediate flight from, a robbery ... or a kidnapping." 160 The problem
with this instruction was that the "was committed" language was
"worded entirely in the passive voice, [and] require[d] no finding of any
actus reus on behalf of the defendant." 16 1 This meant that the jury
could have imposed the death penalty on Roberts "even if he did not
personally cause the victim's death or if he was only a minor participant
in the underlying events." 162 The court held that "major participation
by a defendant in the acts giving rise to the homicide is required in
order to execute a defendant convicted solely as an accomplice to
premeditated first degree murder." 16 3 Because the jury had not been
properly instructed along these lines, the conviction of premeditated
first-degree murder, and the death penalty that went with it, were

reversed. 164
In Zavalza-Rodriguez and Roberts, the use of the passive voice in
Sentencing Guidelines and a jury instruction worked to the benefit of
criminal defendants, but the passive voice can also cut in the other
direction and lengthen a sentence. In United States v. Farmer,16 5 the
defendant was prepared to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of
violating a federal child pornography law. The question before the
court was whether the maximum term of punishment was five or ten

157.
158.

Id. at 719-21.
Id. at 732.
159. Id. at 730-31 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (West 2008); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (West 2008)).
160. Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 733.
164. Id. at 734. However, the court affirmed Roberts' first degree felony murder conviction.
Id. at 747. But this conviction did not include the death penalty. Id.
165. No. CR-05-88-B-W, 2006 WL 378164 (D. Me. Feb. 15, 2006).
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years. 16 6 At the time, if the pornography had been transmitted in
interstate commerce, the penalty for violating the federal statute was
five years. 167 However, the defendant's possession of the pornography
occurred after Congress had amended the statute to increase the
maximum penalty to ten years. 16 8 In determining which was the proper
punishment, the court looked at the language of the statute which
provided that "any person who . . . knowingly possesses any book,
magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or other material
that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or
shipped, or transportedin interstate or foreign commerce by any means
169
...shall be punished."'
The court explained that "the statutory requirement of transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce is a jurisdictional element and does not
require scienter on the part of the defendant." 170 On the other hand, the
substance of the crime was "the knowing possession of child
pornography." 17 1 The court noted that this part of the statute was
written "in the active voice" ("knowingly possesses") while "the
interstate or foreign commerce phrase [was] in the passive voice ['has
been mailed, or shipped, or transported'] and [did] not require actual
knowledge" by the defendant. 17 2 As the court pointed out, the statute
did not say, "Any person who knowingly receives or distributes any
child pornography that he knowingly transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." 173 Had Congress drafted the jurisdictional transmission
requirement in the active voice and thus required the defendant himself
to have done the interstate transmitting, then that act by the defendant
would have been a material element of the crime. If that had been the
case, then imposing the ten-year sentence might well have been a
violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. However, in
the actual statute adopted by Congress, "[t]he gravamen of [the] crime
is the knowing possession of child pornography-not the act of moving
it in interstate commerce."' 174 Thus, the maximum term was ten, not
75
five, years. 1

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
Id. at "2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 n.3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
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In Weaver v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 176 the
voice of the verb also affected the result. The Retirement System had
sent a letter to a retiree indicating that his benefits would be terminated
due to perceived incompetency, at least until a conservator was
appointed. 177 The letter to the retiree stated that an in-home visit by a
department investigator had raised the issue of the retiree's
competence.1 7 8 The letter then continued, "[h]is/[h]er observation could
17 9
be negated by a certification of a medically qualified psychiatrist."'
The court examined this letter to determine whether or not it complied
with the minimum requirement of the Due Process Clause-"notice of
1 80
the case against him and an opportunity to meet it."
The court found that the plaintiff had not received constitutionally
adequate notice of his right to challenge the department's termination of
benefits. 18 1 Specifically, the court found that "[t]he notice here does not
clearly state that claimant had an opportunity to be heard; rather, it
states, in the passive voice, that 'His/her observation could be negated
by a certification of a medically qualified psychiatrist.' It is thus not
clear who must provide this evidence." 18 2 The court suggested that this
language by itself might not be fatal, but, because it followed a sentence
that was supposed to include that claimant's name, "it sounds as if it
refers to the claimant declaring himself incompetent."' 183 Such an
interpretation would be "nonsensical," and therefore the court found
that the letter did not provide claimant with "notice reasonably
calculated to apprise him . . . that he had an opportunity to rebut

defendants' finding that he was incompetent."' 184 Had the letter writer
for the department used the active, rather than the passive, voice (e.g.,
"You may challenge this finding of incompetence by filing the
following papers: .

.

.

."), the letter would probably have met the

minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause.
In the cases cited in this section, the voice of the verb affected court
decisions on criminal sentencing and the appropriate notice under the

176. 717 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
177. Id. at 1042.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 1045 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See id. ("[D]efendants' notice of October 6, 1987 is so confusing that a reasonable lay
person would not have known that he had an opportunity in fact to contest defendants' finding of
incapacity.").
182. Id. at 1045-46 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 1046.
184. Id.
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Due Process Clause. Because of the active or passive voice, a death
sentence was set aside, a sentence was reduced, another sentence was
increased, and a retirement benefit was saved. Voice matters.
C. Tense
"Tense" refers to the time of the action of a verb. 185 There are six
tenses: three simple and three perfect. The simple present tense refers
to action going on at the present time or habitually occurring, e.g.,
"John sees the train," or "John eats cereal every morning." The
progressive form of the present tense represents continuing action, e.g.,
"John is running." The emphatic form of the present tense gives
emphasis to the verb form, e.g., "John does run." The simple past tense
refers to action completed at a definite time in the past, e.g., "John
wrote the letter yesterday." The simple future tense refers to action that
will take place in the future, e.g., "John will write the letter tomorrow."
The present perfect tense refers to action already completed or
continuing in the present, e.g., "John has written the letter" or "John has
lived here for many years." The past perfect tense refers to action
completed before some other past action began, e.g., "John had written
the letter by the time he went to bed." The future perfect tense refers to
action that will be completed before a certain time in the future, e.g.,
"John will have written the letter when we arrive tomorrow." The
Supreme Court has noted that "Congress' use of a verb tense is
significant in construing statutes." 186 The following are cases where the
verb tense was significant to courts' decisions.
In United States v. Wilson, the Supreme Court considered the case of
a man who had been convicted of a federal crime but who was hoping
to receive credit for time already served. 187 The question was whether
the calculation of credit was to be made by the district court at the time
of sentencing or by the Attorney General at a later time when the
defendant had already begun to serve his sentence. 188 The defendant,
Richard Wilson, had pleaded guilty to various state and federal crimes
and had been in state prison since October 1988.189 In November 1989,
the federal district court sentenced Wilson to ninety-six months
imprisonment but denied Wilson credit for the time he had served in

185. See LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 625-31 (discussing verb tense).
186. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992).
187. Id. at331-32.
188. Id. at 332-33.
189. Id. at 331.
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state prison. 190 Wilson appealed the district court's refusal to give him
credit for time served in state custody, and the court of appeals
reversed.'1 9 1 The Supreme Court reinstated the district court's decision,
at least in part because of the tense of the verb in the Sentencing Reform
Act, which governed the granting of credit.1 92 That statute provided,
"[a] defendant shall be given credit . . . for any time he has spent in
official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . as a
result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed [or as a result
of certain other charges].' 19 3 In interpreting this language, the Court
focused on the tense of the two verbs "has spent" and "was
imposed."' 194 According to the Court, "By using these verbs in the past
and present perfect tenses, Congress has indicated that computation of
the credit must occur after the defendant begins his sentence. A district
court, therefore, cannot apply [the imprisonment credit statute] at
sentencing." 19 5 This meant that the authority to grant credit was not in
the district court but, by default, in the Attorney General in his role as
overseer of the Bureau of Prisons. 19 6 Therefore, the defendant, having
no right to receive credit from the district court, would receive a
19 7
sentence fourteen months longer than otherwise.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Wilson, would have interpreted the
statute differently. 19 8 Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court should
look "not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of
the statute as a whole and to its object and policy." 19 9 For Stevens, the
tense of a verb in the statute could not outweigh the design and policy
of the statute. 200 Stevens conceded that the credit decision must be
made "after 'the sentence was imposed' and that the credit shall include
time spent in official detention 'prior to the date the sentence
commences.' 20 1 Nevertheless, Stevens emphasized not the tense, but
the voice of the verb. 20 2 The statutory language "[a] defendant shall be
190. Id. One month later, in December 1989, a state court sentenced Wilson to prison and
gave him credit for the 429 days he had already spent in state prison. Id.
191. United States v. Wilson, 916 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 329 (1992).
192. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333.
193. Id. at 332 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2000)).
194. Id. at 333.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 334-35.
197. Id. at 335.
198. See id. at 337-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 337 (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)).
200. Id. at 337-38.
201. Id. at 342.
202. Id. at 341-42.
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given credit" was in the passive voice, so it did not "specify who will
make the decision about jail credit." 20 3 For Stevens, this meant that
"the appropriate decisionmaker may be either the judge or the Attorney
General depending on the circumstances." 20 4 As to the temporal
element that seemed to limit the discretion of the district court, Stevens
suggested that the court could make the credit determination "at the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing," 20 5 at which time one could say
that the sentence had already been imposed. Unfortunately for Richard
Wilson, the majority opinion emphasized the tense, rather than the
voice, of the verbs in the statute, and the result was an extra fourteen
20 6
months in prison.
In Barrett v. United States,20 7 the Supreme Court construed the tense
of a verb to interpret the federal Gun Control Act. 20 8 The defendant
was a resident of Kentucky who had been convicted of housebreaking
and sentenced to a two-year prison term. 20 9
He subsequently
purchased, in a Kentucky store, a gun that had been manufactured in
2 10
Massachusetts and shipped through North Carolina to Kentucky.
2 11
The defendant was convicted of violating the Gun Control Act,
which made it unlawful for any person who had been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year "to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce." 2 12 The defendant appealed on the
ground that Congress, in the exercise of its power under the Commerce
Clause, intended only to regulate the business of interstate gun
trafficking and was not concerned with the sale of an individual gun by
2 3
a local merchant to a local resident. 1
The Court rejected that argument, insisting that if "Congress intended
to confine [the statute] to direct interstate receipt, it would have so
provided. ' 2 14 Rather, Congress drafted the statute so that "while the

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
(1968)).
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id. at 339.
423 U.S. 212 (1976) (interpreting the federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)
18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1968).
Barrett,423 U.S. at 213.
Id. at213-14.
Id. at 212-13.
18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(4) (1968) (emphasis added).
Barrett, 423 U.S. at 215-16.
Id. at 217.
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proscribed act, 'to receive any firearm,' is in the present tense, the
interstate commerce reference ['has been shipped or transported'] is2in
15
the present perfect tense, denoting an act that has been completed.
Thus, it was not stretching the language of the statute to apply it to "a
firearm that already has completed its interstate journey and has come to
rest in the dealer's showcase at the time of its purchase and receipt by
the felon." 2 16 The Court noted that the structure and pattern of the
entire statute provided additional support for its grammatical
interpretation of the Gun Control Act, in that the statute was designed
"broadly to keep firearms away" from dangerous persons. 2 17 For the
defendant Barrett, it was unfortunate that Congress had chosen to use
the present perfect tense.
In United States v. Jackson,2 18 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, construing the language of a federal statute that criminalized
certain forms of illicit sexual conduct by Americans traveling abroad,
focused on the tense of a statutory verb to save the accused from
conviction. 2 19 In Jackson, the defendant had traveled to Cambodia in
2002, the statute had been enacted in April of 2003, and the defendant
committed "illicit sexual" acts with minors in Cambodia in June of
2003.22o The defendant was arrested by Cambodian authorities and
turned over to the officials of the United States who prosecuted him
under the federal statute. 22 1 The issue before the court was the temporal
reach of the statute, which covered "[a]ny United States citizen ...who
travels in foreign commerce and engages in any illicit sexual
conduct." 2 22 Citing Wilson, the court confirmed that "Congress' use of
a verb tense is significant in construing statutes." 22 3 The verbs in the
statute that criminalized certain conduct were both in the present tense,
and "the use of the present tense in [the statute] indicate[d] that
Congress desired only to cover individuals traveling after the enactment
of the statute; one would not refer in the present tense to something that
had already happened. 2 24 As further authority, the court cited the
Supreme Court for the proposition that "the undeviating use of the

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
480 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1016-21.
id. at 1015-16.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1018 (emphasis added) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)).
Id. at 1019.
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present tense strongly suggests [that] the harm sought to be addressed
2 25
...lies in the present or the future, not in the past."
If the rules of grammar were not sufficient authority for this
interpretation of the present tense, the federal Dictionary Act confirmed
it.2 2 6 That statute provides: "In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . .. words used in the
present tense include the future as well as the present., 227 Significantly,
under the terms of the Act, "Congress did not say that its usage of the
present tense applies to past actions, an omission that... could not have
been an oversight." 2 28 Further confirmation of this interpretation of the
present-tense "travels" as not applying to pre-Act conduct was the
companion statutory word "engages." 2 29 The government had conceded
that this part of the statute could be violated only by post-enactment
''engaging" in prohibited conduct because to interpret the language
otherwise might create a violation of the Constitution's ex post facto
provision. 2 30 Therefore, the court explained that "because Congress
used the same tense in both elements, we give both the same temporal
reach. '23 1 Thus, the language of the statute covered "only travel that
occurred after the statute's enactment." 2 32 The court then determined
that Jackson's travel had been completed before the statute was enacted,
23 3
and thus it was correct to dismiss his indictment.
The use of the future tense also has legal consequences. In In re
Brookshire Bros., Ltd.,23 4 the court considered the applicability of an
arbitration provision in a contract. 2 35 Mayfield, an employee of
Brookshire Brothers, had been injured in the course of her employment
in 2004.236 More than a year later, her employer enacted a policy
requiring arbitration of claims by employees. 2 37 When Mayfield filed a
suit alleging that her employer's negligence had proximately caused her

225. Id. (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
59(1987)).
226. See I U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (setting forth rules of construction).
227. Id.
228. Jackson, 480 F.3d at 1019.
229. Id. at 1020.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1021.
233. Id. at 1022-24.
234. 198 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App. 2006).
235. Id. at 381.
236. Id. at 384.
237. Id.
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238
injuries, the employer sought to compel her to arbitrate the dispute.
The issue before the court was the retroactive application of the
arbitration policy to an event that occurred before the policy was
adopted. 2 39 The court explained that the rule it was following was that
"[a]n arbitration provision will cover disputes under prior contracts
where the clause contains retroactive, time-specific language mandating
240
its application to previously executed contracts."
The court examined that language of the arbitration clause, which
provided, "[t]he policy will cover all disputes arising out of your
relationship with [your employer]." '2 4 1 Interpreting this language, the
court emphasized the tense of the verb:
The verb "will" when used as an auxiliary verb indicates a future tense
action to be performed by the main verb. Thus, the verb phrase "will
cover" indicates future action, as distinguished from the phrase's
present tense counterpart "covers." The structure of the sentence does
not suggest that past events are subject to this arbitration provision
....Since the structure of the provision indicates that this language
was meant to apply only to future events, it is proper to conclude with
assurance that [the parties] did not intend to arbitrate
disputes
24 2
occurring before the effective date of the arbitration policy.
Because of the future tense, Mayfield would have her day in court.
The future perfect tense has also played a determinative role. The
case of Anderson v. Emerson Electric Co.2 43 also involved a contractual
dispute between an employer and employee, concerning eligibility for a
disability pension. 244 In this case, Anderson, the employee, had worked
for Emerson for fourteen years when, at the age of thirty-three, she
became disabled and her employment with Emerson was terminated.24 5
The company's disability plan provided that, in order to qualify for a
disability pension, the person must be "[a]n active Participant who shall
have attained at least age 40, who has at least 10 years of Pension
Credited Service, and who becomes permanently and totally
disabled. 246 About eight years after leaving the company, after

238. Id. at 383.
239. Id. at 384.
240. Id. at 385 n.2 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kirton, 719 So. 2d
201,203 (Ala. 1998)).
241. Id.at 386.
242. Id. (citations omitted).
243. 161 F. App'x 504 (6th Cir. 2005).
244. Id. at 505.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
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Anderson turned forty, she applied for a disability pension. 247 Her
request was denied because she had not met "the age requirement at the
' 2 48
time of [her] disability."
Anderson disputed that interpretation of the policy, and the question
24 9
for the court was "when the age requirement ... must be satisfied.
The court's analysis emphasized the grammatical structure of the plan,
which established the age requirement as a "condition precedent to the
disability requirement." 250 The eligible claimant is one who "shall have
attained at least age 40... and who becomes permanently and totally
disabled.",25 1 According to the court, "Use of the future perfect tense
('shall have attained') expresses the idea that one event will occur
The court then affirmed the
before another in the future." 252
reasonableness of the employer's interpretation of the contract
language-that, in order to be eligible, "Anderson must have attained
the age of 40 before she becomes disabled. '25 3 Unfortunately for
Anderson, the use of the future perfect tense in her contract with her
employer meant that she was not eligible for a disability pension.
The cases in this section illustrate the importance of verb tense to the
resolution or avoidance of legal arguments. The tense of the verb in
these cases increased a prison sentence, provided the basis for a
conviction, saved a defendant from a conviction, gave one disgruntled
employee her day in court, and denied another employee a pension.
Tense matters.
D. Person
The "person" of a verb is a concept that identifies whether the subject
of the verb is the speaker, one spoken to, or one spoken about.254 First
person refers to the person speaking, e.g., "I am a professor." Second
person refers to the person or thing spoken to, e.g., "You are a student."
Third person refers to the person or thing spoken about, e.g., "John is a
student." As these examples illustrate, the first, second, and third
person verbs are inextricably connected with the first, second, and third
person pronouns of I, we, you, he, she, it, and they. In the following
247. Id. at 505.
248. Id. at 505-06.
249. Id. at 506.

250. Id. at 506-07.
251.
252.
253.
254.
subjects

Id. at 507.
Id.
Id.
See generally LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 977 (describing the relationship between
and verbs).
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three cases, the use of a particular grammatical person had a significant
effect on the outcome of a case.
In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the owners of the
copyright to Gone With the Wind (GWTW) sued the publishers of an
allegedly infringing book, The Wind Done Gone (TWDG).25 5 GWTW is
Margaret Mitchell's very successful novel of plantation life, the
Confederacy, and the Civil War. 256 TWDG is a parody of Mitchell's
work, told from the perspective of the slaves rather than of the
plantation owners, and it subverts much of the heroic majesty portrayed
in GWTW. 257 In analyzing the claim of copyright infringement, the
court conceded that the second work had used substantial portions of the
first and had "appropriat[ed] numerous characters, settings, and plot
twists from GWTW. ' '2 58 However, the copyright statute provides an
exception for the "fair use" of copyrighted material. 2 59 The court noted
that parody "is a form of comment and criticism that may constitute a
fair use of the copyrighted work being parodied. ' 260 One important part
of the test for treating a parody as fair use of copyrighted material is
whether the second work is "transformative," that is, "whether the new
work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
261
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."
26 2
The court then found that TWDG was "transformative."
Specifically, it recognized that TWDG "is principally and purposefully a
critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective,
judgments, and mythology of GWTW. ' '26 3 TWDG's "literary goal is to
explode the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during
and after the Civil War." 2 64 One important part of the "transformative"
nature of TWDG was the perspective from which it was told.26 5 The
court stated that GWTW
is a third-person epic, whereas the new work is told in the first-person
as an intimate diary of Cynara [a slave]. Thematically, the new work

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11 th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1259, 1267.
Id. at 1259, 1270.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1267-68.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1269 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
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provides a different viewpoint of the antebellum world .... While told

more critically, the story is transformed
from a different perspective,
2 66
into a very different tale.
The concurring judge was quite explicit on the importance of the
change in grammatical person to the "transformative" nature of the
parody. 26 7 He explained:
The Wind Done Gone takes diary form: its chronology is disjunctive
and its language often earthy. It is told from an introspective firstperson point of view. Mitchell's story, by comparison, is a linear
third-person narrative, epic in scope and staid in tone. Perhaps [the
author] based her story on the perceptions of a single character to
in contrast to
underscore the inherent subjectivity of storytelling,
2 68
Mitchell's disembodied, "objective" narrator.
The bottom line was that, at least in part because of the switch from
third person to first person narration, TWDG was the kind of parody of
GWTW that was protected by the fair use doctrine, and the district
court's issuance of a preliminary injunction preventing its publication
2 69
was wrong.
CICCorp Inc. v. AIMTech Corp.270 is another case in which the use
of the first person form of the verb was critical to the result. CICCorp
involved two former business partners, Hickson and Collins, who had
owned CICCorp, a corporation that developed and marketed software
used for the maintenance of hospital equipment. 27 1 After a serious
falling out, the partners split up and Hickson became the owner of
CICCorp. 2 72 Collins started a rival company that attempted to do
business with the same customers. 27 3 At issue in the case was the use of
a service mark relating to the word "AIM," which had been used by
CICCorp in its advertising and promotions. 274 Collins, in promoting his
new business and trying to suggest a history of providing quality service
to customers, announced, "[S]ince we launched the AIM concept in
1996, we increased the level of savings several times,275with each
discount passed along to both new and existing customers."

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id. at 1279 (Marcus, J., specially concurring).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1270, 1277 (majority opinion).
32 F. Supp. 2d 425, 441-42 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 428, 44 1.
Id. at 441.
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Hickson contended that this language constituted false advertising in
violation of the federal Lanham Act. 276 Collins argued that his claim
was not deceptive because he himself had developed the AIM concept
while he was working at CIC. 27 7 The court conceded that, if that were
all that Collins had claimed, his statement would be accurate and not
actionable. 2 78 However, as the court explained, Collins's claim went
beyond that.2 79 The "statement appeared in an AIMTech proposal and
used the pluralfirst-personpronoun 'we,' not the singular third-person
pronoun 'he' that one would expect to see if the author of the statement
intended to refer only to Collins." 280 The court referenced first and
third person "pronouns" rather than first and third person verb forms,
but, as noted above, these usages are inseparable. 28 1 The use of "we"
implied that AIMTech, the new corporation, had developed the AIM
28 2
concept, when in fact Collins developed it while working for CIC.
Because this use of the first person rather than the third person was
likely to deceive customers, the court found that, at this summary
judgment stage of the case, a factfinder could conclude that there had
been deception and thus refused to grant summary judgment for
2 83
Collins's new company.
United States v. Davis2 84 was a criminal case in which the validity of
an affidavit for a search warrant turned on the improper use of the first
person form of the verb. 2 85 In Davis, the defendant was convicted on
multiple counts of narcotics violations. 286 Davis had asked the district
court for "an evidentiary hearing to traverse the search warrant
affidavits and attack their veracity," 28 7 a request that the court would
grant if Davis made a "sufficient offer of proof of deliberate falsehood
or reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant." 288 The district court
denied such a hearing but was reversed on appeal. 289 Two warrants had

276. Id. at 440.
277. Id. at 441.

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. See supra Part II.D (describing first and third person verbs and first and third person
pronouns as "inextricably connected").
282. CICCorp., 32 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42.
283. Id.
284. 663 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1981).
285. Id. at 827, 829-30.
286. Id. at 826-27.
287. Id. at 829.
288. Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978)).
289. Id. at 829-30.
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been prepared in the case, and Officer Thompson, the affiant whose
warrant was being contested, had simply copied much of the
information received from informants from the first affidavit into his
affidavit. 290 In doing so, Officer Thompson failed to change the person
of the verb forms, which resulted in the affidavit's being in the first
person singular. 2 9 1 This implied Thompson had personally met with the
informants, while in actuality Thompson was only repeating the
contents of the first affidavit prepared by Officer Epstein. 29 2 Thus,
contrary to the language in the affidavit, Officer Thompson had not
communicated directly with any of the informants. 29 3 The appellate
court decided that this discrepancy entitled Davis to an evidentiary
hearing to assess the validity of the affidavit because "the conversations
discussed in the affidavit were not 'within the personal knowledge of
the affiant[s]."' 29 4 The hearing was to be "on the limited issue
pertaining to Officer Thompson's incorrect use of the first-person
singular in his affidavit." 2 95 For the court, a police officer's sworn
statement that "I have met with an informant," was quite different6 from
29
the claim that "he [a fellow officer] has met with an informant."
In each of the cases in this section, the person of the verb affected the
outcome: a parody did not violate the copyright laws, an ad constituted
false advertising, and a police officer's affidavit in a criminal matter
may have been inadequate. Person matters.
E. Number
"Number" refers to whether a verb is singular or plural.2 9 7 The
number of the verb was determinative in the following cases. In United
States v. Midwest Suspension & Brake,29 8 Midwest, a company that
supplied parts for truck suspensions, steering systems, and brakes, had
been found in the trial court to have violated the National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Asbestos (the Asbestos

290. Id. at 829.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 829-30.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 830 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978)).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 829-30.
297. See LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 976 (noting "number" refers to the "form of a noun or
pronoun that indicates whether it is singular (book, I, he, her, it) or plural (books, we, they, them,
their')).
298. 49 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995).
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NESHAP) and had been ordered to pay a $50,000 penalty. 299 The
30 0
Asbestos NESHAP prohibited certain visible emissions of asbestos,
defining "visible emissions" as "any emissions containing particulate
asbestos material that are visually detectable without the aid of
instruments." 30 1 On appeal, Midwest argued that, although the EPA
inspectors had seen dust emissions on site, these dust emissions were
not sufficient proof of a violation "because the inspectors did not see,
with the naked eye, asbestos particles floating in the dust." 30 2 The court
30 3
responded by looking closely at the definition of "visible emissions."
The disagreement between the parties concerned "which word the
phrase 'that are visually detectable without the aid of instruments'
modifies." 30 4 Midwest argued that it modified "particulate asbestos
material. ' 30 5 Under this reading, the asbestos material itself must be
visible to the naked eye. 30 6 The government argued that the phrase
modified "any emissions." 30 7 Under this reading, the definition did not
require that the asbestos particles themselves be visible "but only
require[d] visual observation of the dust emissions which contain the
30 8
invisible particles."
The court resolved this dispute by reference to the number of the
verb: "[T]he verb in the sentence (are) is in the plural form, indicating
that the subject of the verb is the plural word 'emissions,' not the
singular word-phrase 'particulate asbestos material.' ' 30 9 The court held
that the Asbestos NESHAP standard required visible observation only
3 10
of the emissions, not a visible observation of the asbestos itself.
Accordingly, it affirmed the district court's conclusion that Midwest
had violated the Asbestos NESHAP. 3 1 1 The plural form of the verb
made the difference.
In Davis v. Pletcher,3 12 the buyer and seller had entered into a
contract for the sale of a piece of property under which the seller's deed
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1200 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 61.144, 61.150 (2007)).
Id. at 1204 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2007)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
727 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1987).

2008]

Why Grammar Matters

covenanted that the property conveyed was at least 670 acres. 3 13 The
deed provided that the covenant would be considered broken if, within
five years of the closing, the buyer provided the seller with "the results
of a subsequent survey ... which discloses by certified field notes and
plat that there are fewer than six hundred seventy (670) acres under
fence." 3 14 It turned out that the property was only 628 acres, and the
buyer made a claim as the five-year period was expiring. 3 15 On the last
day of the period, the buyer delivered to the seller a mailgram that gave
3 16
the seller notice of a survey of the property that showed the shortage.
Shortly after the deadline, the buyer provided the seller with a copy of
the survey plat and field notes prepared by the surveyor. 3 17 The seller
rejected the buyer's claim and refused to pay the compensation that
would be owed for the shortage on the ground that the buyer's claim
was not timely. 3 18 Specifically, the seller argued that the deed covenant
required the buyer to provide, within the five-year period, the survey
3 19
itself, with field notes and plats.
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling in
favor of the seller based on the number of the verb "discloses." 320 The
Court of Appeals explained:
It is fundamental to the rules of English grammar that a verb must
agree in number (singular or plural) with its subject. . . These
grammatical axioms clearly show that the singular phrase "which
discloses by certified field notes and plat . . ." modifies the singular
antecedent "survey" rather than the plural antecedent "results." Thus
the grammatical construction of the covenant clearly reveals that it is
the subsequent survey which must disclose by certified field notes and
plat that
an acreage deficiency exists, not the "results" which must do
1
so.

32

This was good news for the buyer: because he had provided "the
results" of the survey within the required time, he had satisfied his
contractual obligation. 322 It did not matter that he had not provided "the

313. Id. at 30-31.
314. Id. at 33.
315. Id. at 31.
316. Id. It was not clear whether the five-year period expired on June 30, the date of the
mailgram, or on July 6, but because the June 30 mailgram turned out to be adequate notice to the
seller, it did not matter. Id. at 31, 33.
317. Id. at31.
318. Id.
319. Id. at31,33.
320. Id. at 33-34.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 34.
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survey" itself, with its accompanying field notes and plat. 32 3 The
singular form of the verb made that clear.
State v. Sample324 was a criminal case in which the singular form of
the verb helped to convict the defendant Sample. 3 25 In that case,
Sample, a prison guard, was trapped in a sting operation in which he
received cocaine from a woman who Sample thought was an inmate's
girlfriend but who was actually an undercover detective. 32 6 When
Sample was later charged with conspiracy to possess a controlled
substance, he argued that there could not be a conspiracy unless there
were two people conspiring. 3 27 The court responded to this defense by
looking at the language of the conspiracy statute.3 28 The statute
provided that "whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees
or combines with another for the purpose of committing that crime may
..be fined or imprisoned. ' 329 The court explained that there are two
different understandings of the crime of conspiracy-the unilateral and
Under the unilateral approach, "the subjective,
the bilateral.3 3 °
individual behavior of a defendant" 33 1 determines guilt, and a
"conspiracy will lie even where one of two alleged 'co-conspirators' is,
unknown to the defendant, an undercover police agent." 33 2 Under the
two or more persons
bilateral theory, a conspiracy exists only "where
' 3 33
agree, with criminal intent, to commit a crime.
In deciding which of the two understandings of conspiracy the statute
supported, the court looked at the singular number of the verbs
"agrees," and "combines." 3 34 The court noted that the indefinite
pronoun "whoever," the subject of the sentence, could, by itself, be
singular or plural.33 5 The defendant, turning grammatical rules upside
down, argued that the terms "agrees" and "combines" "imply
plurality." 336 The court rejected that claim. 3 37 The court did not "read
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
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573 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1998).
Id. at 188, 191-93, 195-96.
Id. at 189.
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Id. at 191.
WlS. STAT. ANN. § 939.31 (West 2005).
Sample, 573 N.W.2d at 191.
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the terms 'agrees' or 'combines' strictly to require application to a
unilateral conspiracy," 338 but did conclude that "the singular form of
'agrees' and 'combines' when used with the indefinite pronoun
'whoever' represents subject-verb agreement within the language of the
statute." 3 39 The court then found that the language of the statute
criminalized unilateral as well as bilateral conspiracies and affirmed
Sample's conviction. 340 The singular form of the verbs in the statute
may not have required the court to adopt the unilateral theory of
conspiracy, but the form certainly helped to justify that result.
In the cases in this section, courts used the number of the verb to find
a violation of an air pollution standard, to determine satisfaction of a
contract obligation, and to convict a defendant of conspiracy. Number
matters.
F. Verbals: Gerunds, Infinitives, and Participles
Verbals are verb forms that function as other parts of speech. 34 1 A
gerund is a verbal noun typically formed by adding ing to the base form
of the verb. 34 2 Because a gerund is used as a noun, it can be the subject
of a sentence, e.g., "Walking is good exercise," or the direct object of a
sentence, e.g., "I enjoy walking." In addition, because a gerund is a
verb form, it can take a direct object, e.g., "I enjoy reading books." The
gerund also has a perfect form, e.g., "I do not like to write but I enjoy
having written," and a passive form, e.g., "I enjoy being loved," but
these forms are rarely used.
An infinitive is the base form of the verb introduced by "to," e.g., "to
run," and it has a variety of uses. 343 The infinitive serves as a noun,
e.g., "To win is not easy," or "I like to win." Additionally, it can be
used in an adverbial phrase, e.g., "She came to see us." The infinitive
also has perfect ("to have loved") and passive ("to be loved") forms.
The participle is a verbal adjective. 34 4 The present participle is
formed by adding ing to the base form or the verb, e.g., "the running
water." The participle also has a perfect form, with active ("Having
won the race, the champion rejoiced") and passive ("Having been

338. Id.
339. Id. at 192-93.
340. Id. at 195-96.
341. WALSH & WALSH, supra note 14, at 31.
342. Id.
343. See LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 974 (defining an infinitive as "the base form of a verb
preceded by to (to go, to run, to hit)").
344. Id. at 976.
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defeated at cards, John left the table") meanings. Because the participle
A
does the work of an adjective, ordinarily it must modify a noun. 345
freestanding participle, with no noun to modify, is called "dangling."
Such a construction is to be avoided, e.g., "Sweating fiercely, the work
was finished quickly." In the following cases, the court interpreted a
gerund, infinitive, or participle to explain its decision.
In Doe v. Bridgeport Police Department,346 the court interpreted the
language of a Connecticut statute that provided an exemption from the
criminalization of certain drug paraphernalia. In order to encourage
certain remedial substance abuse programs, the statute exempted certain
"hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for use
or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into
the human body." 34 7 The question before the court was whether this
exemption covered "cookers and cottons," products used in the
34 8
preparation of cocaine for injection but not part of the injection itself.
The court concluded that the exemption covered cookers and cotton, at
legislature had defined the
least in part because the Connecticut
34 9
gerund-injecting.
a
with
exemption
The court considered two possible interpretations of the statutory
language.350 The exemption might extend to "objects, such as cookers
and cottons, often used in the process of injecting drugs," 35 1 or it might
be limited to "objects directly used to inject drugs parenterally into a
person's body." 35 2 The first, broader interpretation of the statute would
include cookers and cottons within the exemption while the second
definition would not.35 3 The court chose the first interpretation. 354 The

345. GARNER, supra note 8, at 145.
346. 434 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Conn. 2006).
347. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-240(20)(A)(ix) (1958) (emphasis added), amended by Act
Concerning Revisions to Department of Public Health Statutes, 2006 Conn. Acts 06-195, § 15
(Reg. Sess.). The specific definition cited in the text here was deleted and replaced with the
phrase, "objects used, intended for use or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise
introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body." Act Concerning
Revisions to Department of Public Health Statutes § 15. This amendment also deleted the word
"injecting" from the introductory paragraph of section 20(A) of the statute. Id. The Doe court
defined "parenterally" as meaning "[b]y some other means than through the gastrointestinal
tract." Doe, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 116 n.7 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1316 (27th
ed. 2000)).
348. Doe, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 109, 114.
349. Id. at 116-18.
350. Id. at 114-15.
351. Id. at 116.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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court explained its choice: "First, the gerund 'injecting,' . . . connotes
'the process of injection,' in contrast to 'to inject' [an infinitive], which
connotes, to a greater degree, the specific and direct act of introducing a
substance into the human body parenterally." 3 55 The court compared
the gerund form of the verb in the statute under consideration with the
infinitive form in a companion statute, which provided that "no person
shall use ...

drug paraphernalia ... to plant, propagate, cultivate ...
35 6

or

to inject, ingest, inhale . .. any controlled substance."
The court
explained that the lists of verbs in the two statutes were identical, but
the forms of the verbs were different. 357 The legislature used the
gerund construction when defining the exemption and the infinitive
construction when defining the crime. 35 8 The court concluded that the
legislature's use of the gerund construction "entail[ed] the broader
meaning that the gerund verb construction connotes." 3 59 The court then
interpreted this "broader meaning" to include any materials "used as
part of the process of injecting controlled substances, such as cookers
and cottons." 360 Thus, these materials were included within the
statute's exemption from criminality.
The court did not cite any authority for its assertion that the gerund
36 1
construction has a "broader meaning" than does the infinitive.
Grammarians have distinguished the two forms but not typically on
these grounds. It is more common to distinguish the two on the ground
that "infinitives tend to represent intentions, desires, or expectations,
and gerunds tend to represent facts." 36 2 Thus, in the sentence, "The boy
enjoys going to school," the gerund "going" indicates the fact of going.
In the sentence, "He expects to win," the infinitive "to win" indicates an
intention. This common grammatical distinction between fact and
intention does not explain the Doe court's distinction between process
and direct act. The court may have been viewing the ing ending of the
gerund as analogous to the ing ending of the progressive forms of
certain tenses, e.g., "he is running," a form that indicates a continuing
action. However, even though these progressive tenses are formed with
the ing ending that also forms the gerund, the progressive tense is in fact

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
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362.

Id.
Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-267(a) (1958)).
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formed with a participle, not a gerund. 3 63 Even if the grammatical
authority for the court's distinction is not entirely clear, the end result of
the case was quite definite-the injecting drug users had not violated
3 64
the Connecticut statute.
United States v. McDonald365 is another case in which the gerund
form of a verb helped to explain the reach of a criminal statute. In that
case, the defendant McDonald had been convicted of possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute. 366 The apartment where he had been
arrested with the cocaine was across the street from an elementary
school. 367 The question was whether McDonald's sentence should have
been enhanced because of his proximity to the school. 368 A federal
statute doubled the punishment for "distributing, possessing with intent
to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within
one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private
elementary, vocational, or secondary school." 36 9 The question was
whether, in order to prove a violation of the statute, the government had
to prove not only that the defendant had possessed, with intent to
distribute somewhere, a controlled substance within one thousand feet
to
of a school, but also had to prove that the defendant intended
3 70
a
school.
of
feet
thousand
one
within
substance
that
distribute
In answering this question, the court explained that "the geographic
element [the 'within one thousand feet' language] appears to be aimed,
not at any verbs [in the statute], but at the section's verbal nouns, its
gerunds."' 37 1 The gerunds the court was referring to were "distributing,"
"possessing," and "manufacturing. "372 The court noted that with regard
to distributing and manufacturing, it was clear that the statute doubled
the punishment for those activities within one thousand feet of a
school. 37 3 Thus, to give the statute "an internally consistent reading, its
other verbal noun-'possessing'-must be treated in the same
manner." 374 Thus, "when the 'possessing' is done near the school, [the

363.
364.
365.
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367.
368.
369.
370.
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statute] also renders the crime twice as serious." 375 It does not matter
whether the defendant intended to distribute the drugs near the school or
not.37 6 The defendant earned the double punishment by simply
possessing the drugs within one thousand feet of the school.3 77
Unfortunately for McDonald, the internally consistent interpretation of
the three gerunds in the statute meant that he would serve more time in
prison.
The difference between a gerund and a participle determined the
outcome of a $139,000 insurance claim in Transcontinental Insurance
Co. v. RBMW, Inc.3 78 In that case, the insured sought coverage for
damage to his piers, wharves, docks, and boathouse caused by a
hurricane. 379 The insurance policy at issue excluded from coverage any
loss caused directly or indirectly by "[f]lood, surface water, waves,
tides, tidal waves, overflowing of any body of water, or their spray, all
whether driven by wind or not."3 80 The trial judge, bending over
backward to find coverage, found that the exclusion did not apply
because neither the waves nor the tides nor any water "overflowed" the
banks of the James River, where the property was damaged. 38 1 The
trial judge interpreted the phrase "overflowing of any body of water" as
modifying, and thus limiting, the previous words "[f]lood, surface
water, waves, tides, tidal waves." 382 Because all the damage took place
within the boundaries of the river, the trial judge found that the
exclusion did not apply. 383 Although the court did not use the word
"participle," it was in fact interpreting the word "overflowing" as a
participle that limited the previous nouns.
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, "disagree[ing] with the trial
court's grammatical reading of the exclusion." 3 84 The placement of the
commas in the exclusion indicated that "each subject matter must be
separately considered, including 'overflowing of any body of water.' In
this context, the phrase, 'overflowing of any body of water,' is a verbal
noun known as a gerund. ' 385 The "overflowing" exclusion did not
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modify and limit the previous grounds for exclusion, as a participle
would have done, but was its own independent source of exclusion.
Therefore, in interpreting the policy, the trial court should have
examined each of the exclusions separately. It turned out that most of
the damage was caused by a "wave." 3 86 This causal factor was not
limited by a requirement that the wave have overflowed its banks, so the
3 87
exclusion did apply and the court reversed the trial court.
The proper interpretation of a participle determined the outcome of
the court's decision in Management Council of the Wyoming
Legislature v. Geringer.388 In that case, the legislature and the governor
of Wyoming disagreed over the governor's power to veto individual
parts of a bill. 3 89 The state constitutional provision that authorized the
governor's veto provided "[t]he governor shall have power to
disapprove of any item or items or part or parts of any bill making
appropriations of money or property." 3 90 The problem arose when the
governor vetoed non-appropriations portions of an appropriations
bill. 39 1 The issue before the court was whether the governor's veto
authority was limited to appropriations only or whether it extended to
392
any portion of an appropriations bill.
The Wyoming Supreme Court resolved this issue on the basis of a
grammatical reading of the statute. 39 3 Specifically, the question was
what word the participial phrase, "making appropriations of money or
property," modified. 394 The court noted that, as a basic rule, one ought
to "place all modifiers, whether words, phrases, or clauses, as close as
possible to the words they modify, ' 395 so that the meaning of a sentence
would be clear. In the case before it, the court noted that "[tlhe
participial phrase 'making appropriations . . .' immediately follows and
modifies 'any bill.' 39 6 This meant that, if the bill made appropriations,
the governor could veto any part of it. It was not necessary that the
vetoed part itself be an appropriation. If the constitutional provision
were to have the effect argued by the Legislative Council, the court
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noted that it should have read, "In any bill, the governor shall have
power to disapprove of any item or items or part or parts making
appropriations of money or property." 397 In such a statute, the
participle "making" would be modifying, and thus limiting, the nouns
"items" and "parts." However, that was not the actual language of the
Wyoming Constitution. 3 98 In that constitution, the placement of the
participle "making" after the word "bill" gave the governor the power to
399
veto non-appropriations portions of appropriations bills.
In Baker v. City of Lakeside,4 00 a plaintiffs personal injury claim
against the city was preserved by a very technical reading of a
procedural statute that turned on the placement of a participle. The
plaintiff in that case had been injured on August 31, 2002 and had filed
her complaint against the city on August 27, 2004, just days before the
expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. 40 1 However, the
40 2
plaintiff did not serve the summons on the city until four weeks later.
According to one Oregon statute (ORS 12.020(1)),403 an action is
considered commenced only when the plaintiff has both filed the
complaint and served the summons on the defendant. Under this rule,
the plaintiffs case would have been time-barred. However, another
Oregon statute (ORS 12.020(2))4o4 created a sixty-day exception to this
rule, so that an action was considered commenced on the date the
plaintiff filed the complaint if the plaintiff also served the summons on
the defendant within sixty days. Under this rule, the plaintiff's personal
injury suit had been filed in a timely fashion.
The question for the court in Baker was the effect of a third statute on
these two filing statutes. 40 5 When the Oregon Legislature had amended
the Oregon Torts Claim Act in 1981, it provided that "notwithstanding
any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a
limitation on the commencement of an action, an action [against a
public body or public official] shall be commenced within two years
after the alleged loss or injury." 40 6 The city argued that "the participial
phrase 'providing a limitation on the commencement of an action'
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WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
Geringer, 953 P.2d at 844.
164 P.3d 259 (Or. 2007).
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Baker, 164 P.3d at 260.
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modifie[d] only the phrase 'other statute."' 4 °7 Under this reading, the
limiting participial phrase "providing a limitation on the
commencement of an action" did not limit the noun phrase "other
provision of ORS chapter 12." Thus, the "notwithstanding" language
excluded consideration of all provisions of chapter 12. This meant that
the plaintiff would not be able to rely on ORS 12.020(2) and claim the
benefit of the sixty-day window. On the other hand, the plaintiff
claimed that "the participial phrase 'providing a limitation on the
commencement of an action' modifie[d] both 'any other provision of
ORS chapter 12' and 'other statute."' 40 8 Under this interpretation, only
those provisions of chapter 12 that limited the commencement of
actions would be excluded from consideration. Because ORS 12.020(2)
expanded, rather than limited, the commencement of an action, the
"notwithstanding" clause would not exclude it from consideration.
Thus, the plaintiff would have the benefit of the sixty-day look-back
provision, and her claim would not be time barred.
"Grammatically, both interpretations are permissible," 40 9 the court
reasoned, in contemplating these two different interpretations of the
participle "providing." The city's claim was initially bolstered by "the
rule of the last antecedent," under which "[r]eferential and qualifying
words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to
the last antecedent." 4 10 The city argued that, under this rule, the
participle "providing" referred only to the last antecedent, "other
statute," and did not in any way qualify the earlier phrase, "any other
provision." 4 11 The court noted however, that the last antecedent rule
applied only where "no contrary intention appears." 4 12 The court then
went on to point out that, based on the text, the context, and the
legislative history of the statute, there was contrary evidence that
indicated that the participle "providing" was intended to modify, and
4 13
thus to limit, both "other statute" and "any other provision."
Therefore, the plaintiff could claim the benefit of the sixty-day lookback provision and her complaint was timely filed.
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In Ramirez-Ramos v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,4 14 the
interpretation of a perfect passive participle determined whether or not
the petitioner was to be deported. The INS had ordered Ramirez-Ramos
deported in light of his conviction for selling heroin. 4 15 RamirezRamos petitioned for relief on the basis of a statute that would withhold
deportation if an alien's life or freedom would be threatened in the
country to which he would be deported. 4 16 However, that relief was not
available to any alien if the Attorney General determined that "the alien,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
4 17
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States."
Ramirez-Ramos argued that the Board of Immigration Appeals, in
denying him relief, had not followed the statute properly. 4 18 According
to Ramirez-Ramos, the statute required two findings: that he had been
convicted of a serious crime and that he was a danger to the
community. 4 19 The Board considered the conviction alone to be
sufficient to withhold relief as there was no "statutory requirement of a
separate determination of dangerousness." 420 The court agreed with the
Board's interpretation. 4 2 1 The court explained, "[t]he participial phrase,
'having been convicted of a particularly serious crime,' modifies the
word 'alien' and thus limits those aliens who may be determined to
constitute a danger to the community to those who have been finally
convicted of serious crimes. '"422 The statutory language was not written
"with two coordinate clauses joined by a conjunction, e.g. 'the alien has
been convicted . . .and constitutes a danger to the community of the
United States.' 42 3 The use of participle modifying "alien" creates a
"'cause and effect relationship: the fact that the alien has committed a
particularly serious crime makes the alien dangerous within the meaning
of the statute."' 424 Unfortunately for Ramirez-Ramos, having been
convicted of a serious crime, he was, without more, a danger to the
community and thus deportable.
414. 814 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987).
415. Id. at 1395.
416. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994), amended by Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-208 §307(a).
417. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994), amended by Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 104-208 §307(a) (emphasis added).
418. Ramirez-Ramos, 814 F.2d at 1396.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1397.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. (quoting Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932,934 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
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The importance of the infinitive form of the verb was made clear in
State v. Scott.4 25 In that case, the defendant had been convicted under a
statute that made it a crime knowingly to "sell or offer to sell a
controlled substance." 4 26 On appeal, the defendant argued that he had
not committed the crime because the tablets he sold to an undercover
agent had not in fact been a controlled substance. 42 7 Notwithstanding
that fact, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. 428 Citing
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, the court defined the term "offer"
as "'to declare one's readiness or willingness' when it is used with an
infinitive object. ' 4 29 In the statute that defined the crime, "the infinitive
object is 'to sell a controlled substance.' 4 30 It followed then that "[t]he
proscribed conduct is offering to sell a controlled substance, not
offering the controlled substance." 43 1 Thus, the fact that the defendant
transferred tablets that turned out not to be a controlled substance was
not a defense to the prosecution of the crime. This result is consistent
with the grammatical description of infinitives as tending to represent
"intentions, desires, or expectations," rather than facts. 4 32
The
4
3
3
defendant's conviction was affirmed.
In cases discussed in this section, courts construed gerunds to exempt
certain drug paraphernalia from criminalization, increase the penalty for
drug possession near a school, and deny coverage under an insurance
policy. Courts construed participles to expand a governor's veto power,
to preserve a personal injury claim against a city, and to deport an alien.
A court explained the proper use of the infinitive construction in order
to affirm a criminal conviction for offering to sell a controlled
substance. Gerunds, participles, and infinitives matter.
III. CONCLUSION
So then, for lawyers, judges, and law students, does grammar matter?
Yes, it does. Even if infrequently, the proper use of grammatical terms
has sometimes determined the outcome of a case. Verb forms do not

425. State v. Scott, 432 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio 1982), superseded by statute, Am.Sub.S.B.No.2,
146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136 (1996), as recognized in State v. Chandler, 846 N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio
2006).
426. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (West 1996).
427. Scott, 432 N.E.2d at 799.
428. Id. at 800.
429. Id. at 799 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1976)).
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. LUNSFORD, supra note 14, at 854.
433. Scott, 432 N.E.2d at 801.
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have the complexity of the Rule against Perpetuities nor the labyrinthine
intricacy of UCC § 2-207. They are just a small part of basic English
grammar. Nevertheless, legal cases have turned on the person, number,
tense, voice, or mood of a verb, and on the use of a gerund, infinitive, or
participle. In these cases, to be minimally competent, a lawyer needs to
know the language of verbs.
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APPENDIX
Conjugation of the verb "to sue"
ACTIVE VOICE
Indicative Mood

Present Tense

Past Tense

Future Tense

Present Perfect Tense

Past Perfect Tense

Future Perfect Tense

Singular

Plural

1. I sue

1. We sue

2. You sue

2. You sue

3. He sues

3. They sue

1. I sued

1. We sued

2. You sued

2. You sued

3. He sued

3. They sued

I shall sue

We shall sue

You will sue

You will sue

He will sue

They will sue

I have sued

We have sued

You have sued

You have sued

He has sued

They have sued

I had sued

We had sued

You had sued

You had sued

He had sued

They had sued

I shall have sued

We shall have sued

You will have sued

You will have sued

He will have sued

They will have sued

Subjunctive Mood

Present Tense

Singular

Plural

1. I sue

1. We sue

2. You sue

2. You sue

3. He sue

3. They sue
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Past Tense

Present Perfect Tense

Past Perfect Tense
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1. (If) Isued

1. (If) we sued

2. (If) you sued

2. (If) you sued

3. (If) he sued

3. (If) they sued

1. (If) I have sued

1. (If) we have sued

2. (If) you have sued

2. (If) you have sued

3. (If) he have sued

3. (If) they have sued

I. (If) I had sued

1. (If) we had sued

2. (If) you had sued

2. (If) you had sued

3. (If) he had sued

3. (If) they had sued

Singular

Plural

Sue

Sue

Present

Perfect

To sue

To have sued

Present

Perfect

Suing

Having sued

Present

Perfect

Suing

Having sued

Singular

Plural

1. 1am sued

1. We are sued

2. You are sued

2. You are sued

3. He issued

3. They are sued

Imperative Mood

Infinitive

Participle

Gerund

PASSIVE VOICE
Indicative Mood

Present Tense
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Future Tense

Present Perfect Tense

Past Perfect Tense

Future Perfect Tense
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1. I was sued

We were sued

2. You were sued

You were sued

3. He was sued

They were sued

I. I shall be sued

We shall be sued

2. You will be sued

You will be sued

3. He will be sued

They will be sued

1. I have been sued

1. We have been sued

2. You have been sued

2. You have been sued

3. He has been sued

3. They have been sued

I. I had been sued

1. We had been sued

2. You had been sued

2. You had been sued

3. He had been sued

3. They had been sued

1. I shall have been sued

1. We shall have been sued

2. You will have been sued

2. You will have been sued

3. He will have been sued

3. They will have been sued

Singular

Plural

1. I be sued

1. We be sued

2. You be sued

2. You be sued

3. He be sued

3. They be sued

Subjunctive Mood

Present Tense

Past Tense

Present Perfect Tense

(If) I were sued

(If) we were sued

(If) you were sued

(If) you were sued

(If) he were sued

(If) they were sued

(If) I have been sued

(If) we have been sued

(If) you have been sued

(If) you have been sued

(If) he have been sued

(If) they have been sued
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1. (If) I had been sued

1. (If) we had been sued

2. (If) you had been sued

2. (If) you had been sued

3. (If) he had been sued

3. (If) they had been sued

Singular

Plural

Be sued

Be sued

Present

Perfect

To be sued

To have been sued

Imperative Mood

Infinitive

Participle
Present

Past

Perfect

Being sued

Sued

Having been sued

Gerund
Present

Perfect

Being sued

Having been sued

